Effects of the Fiscal Treatment of Tax Losses on the Efficiency of Markets and the Incidence of Mergers by Poitevin, Michel
 Économie publique/Public economics 
11 | 2002/2
Varia
Effects of the Fiscal Treatment of Tax Losses on
the Efficiency of Markets and the Incidence of
Mergers
Michel Poitevin
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/441
ISSN : 1778-7440
Éditeur
IDEP - Institut d'économie publique
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 15 juillet 2003
ISBN : 2-8041-3944-1
ISSN : 1373-8496
 
Référence électronique
Michel Poitevin, « Effects of the Fiscal Treatment of Tax Losses on the Efﬁciency of Markets and the
Incidence of Mergers », Économie publique/Public economics [En ligne], 11 | 2002/2, mis en ligne le 02
janvier 2006, consulté le 22 avril 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/441 
© Tous droits réservés
public economics
économiepublique
Revue de l’Institut d’Économie Publique
Deux numéros par an
no 11 – 2002/2

économiepublique sur internet : www.economie-publique.fr
© Institut d’économie publique – IDEP
Centre de la Vieille-Charité
2, rue de la Charité – F-13002 Marseille
Tous droits réservés pour tous pays.
Il est interdit, sauf accord préalable et écrit de l’éditeur, de reproduire (notamment
par photocopie) partiellement ou totalement le présent ouvrage, de le stocker dans
une banque de données ou de le communiquer au public, sous quelque forme et
de quelque manière que ce soit.
La revue économiepublique bénéficie du soutien du Conseil régional Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur
ISSN 1373-8496
recherches
Michel Poitevin∗
De´partement de sciences e´conomiques, Universite´ de Montre´al
CIREQ and CIRANO
Effects of the Fiscal
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the Efficiency of Markets and
the Incidence of Mergers
Re´sume´
Nous passons en revue dans cette étude les principales ques-
tions touchant la transférabilité des pertes fiscales en cas
de changement de contrôle d’une entreprise. L’opportunité
d’autoriser ou non le transfert des pertes fiscales dépend de
l’efficacité du marché des prises de contrôle. Si les prises de
contrôle accroissant l’efficacité sont trop peu nombreuses, il
convient de les « subventionner ». Si, au contraire, les prises
de contrôles sont trop nombreuses (sous l’angle de l’effica-
cité), il convient de les taxer sous une forme quelconque.
Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, le régime de transférabi-
lité des pertes fiscales peut servir à atteindre l’objectif visé.
Trois aspects sont abordés ici : (1) l’opportunité d’autoriser
le transfert des pertes fiscales en cas de changement de con-
trôle d’une entreprise; (2) l’opportunité d’autoriser ce trans-
fert uniquement lorsque le type d’activité reste le même;
(3) l’opportunité d’autoriser l’utilisation des pertes au même
rythme qu’avant la fusion. Ces questions seront analysées
dans le contexte du contrôle exercé par les directions d’en-
treprise, de la concurrence sur le marché des produits, des
décisions de financement, ainsi que des décisions d’inves-
tissement et de la prise de risque.
∗ This research was financed by the Department of Finance, Government of Canada. An earlier version has appeared as
Working Paper 97-13 of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation of the Department of Finance, Government
of Canada.
I would like to thank Jack Mintz and John Sargent for extensive comments on an earlier draft.
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mots cle´s : Pertes fiscales, fusions.
Summary
This paper surveys the major issues regarding the transfe-
rability of tax losses upon a change of control. Whether
tax losses should be transferable or not depends on whether
the market for corporate control is efficient or not. If there
are too few efficiency-enhancing takeovers, then takeovers
should be “subsidized”. If, on the contrary, there are too
many takeovers (from an efficiency point of view), then ta-
keovers should somehow be taxed. In either case, the trans-
ferability of tax losses may be an instrument for doing so.
Three aspects are considered : (1) whether tax losses should
be transferred upon a change of control or not, (2) whe-
ther the transfer should be restricted to the same line of
business or not, and (3) whether losses should be used at
the same speed at which they were (to be) used pre-merger
or not. These issues are then discussed in the context of
managerial control, product market competition, financing
decisions, and investment decisions and risk-taking.
Key words : tax losses, mergers.
Introduction
It is a well established fact that the asymmetric fiscal treatment of firms’ losses
and profits introduces distortions in economic decisions. An important question
is whether firms can arbitrage away these distortions by any means. Mergers or
takeovers may provide one way of eliminating, or at least reducing, distortions due
to the tax asymmetry. A firm with accumulated losses can merge with a profitable
firm. If this latter firm can use the former’s losses against its taxable income, it
can reduce its tax bill, and by the same token reduce the distortions induced by
the accumulated losses.
This paper surveys the major issues regarding the transferability of tax losses upon
a change of control. Four basic areas where distortions could potentially arise are
studied : corporate governance and managerial control, competition in product
markets, financial decisions, and investment and risk-taking. For each area, the
general approach is (1) to detail the economic distortions and inefficiencies and
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their sources, (2) to study the efficiency with which the market for corporate control
acts to reduce these distortions, and finally (3) to ask whether more takeover
activity should be encouraged via allowing the transfer of tax losses.
Specifically, three aspects of this issue are studied : (1) whether tax losses should
be transferred upon a change of control or not, (2) whether the transfer should
be restricted to the same line of business or not, and (3) whether losses should be
used at the same speed at which they were (to be) used pre-merger or not.
To answer these questions, it is first necessary to define what tax neutrality is
in this context. A global approach would be to define neutrality as the situation
where tax losses would be fully refundable, so that all distortions due to tax losses
asymmetries would be eliminated. I believe, however, that to address the specific
issues set out in this paper with this notion of neutrality would be inappropriate
since other aspects of the question of refundability are clearly outside the scope
of this paper. For example, even without mergers of firms, tax losses are not
fully refundable. I therefore adopt the following narrower definition of neutrality.
Neutrality is defined as tax losses being available on the same basis regardless of
any takeover activity. As will become clear later, we may want to move away from
neutrality for efficiency reasons if the “neutral” situation is inefficient.
Second, the notion of efficiency should also be defined. In this paper, we adopt a
notion of efficiency which relates only to the partial environment under study. For
example, it may be the case that allowing the transfer of tax losses would improve
efficiency in the market for corporate control, but would reduce it globally when
taking into account the fact that government revenues would go down and that,
probably, distortionary taxes would be needed to make up for the lost revenues.
Analyzing such effects is clearly important but beyond the scope of this article.
The next section studies the case of corporate governance and managerial control.
Section 2 analyses distortions in product market competition. Section 3 focuses on
financial decisions, while Section 4 studies investment decisions and risk-taking.
The conclusion follows.
1. Corporate governance and managerial control
It has been known for a long time that the separation of ownership and control
in large public companies creates opportunities for managers to divert resources
from shareholders and bondholders to themselves (see Berle and Means, 1933).
If managers do not own the resources and assets they control, why should they
maximize their value ? The reply to this question was given by Manne (1965). The
threat of takeover or the actual takeover would serve as a disciplinary device to
ensure that efficient decision making prevails within the firm. Thus, the market for
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corporate control would restore economic efficiency. If a manager is misbehaving,
a potential raider would immediately spot this inefficiency. He would then buy
the firm’s stock at a below-value price, restore efficient decision-making, and thus
obtain a capital gain on his shares in this firm. The presence of these capital gains
would be sufficient to give incentives to raiders to seek economic efficiency.
This argument held for a long time. It was not, however, completely convincing
since it implicitly assumed that raiders could better correct inefficiencies than
could stakeholders (shareholders and/or bondholders). To understand whether this
is an appropriate assumption or not, it is necessary to formally detail what are
the sources of the managerial inefficiencies and see how the market for corporate
control can correct them. Therefore, more recently, economists have returned to
the study of the market for corporate control and made precise what were the inef-
ficiencies induced by the separation of ownership and control. These new studies
have shed a new light on our understanding of the market for corporate control.
In this section, I explain how takeovers may or may not improve economic ef-
ficiency, and show how the treatment of tax losses can be incorporated in the
argument. There are two instances where tax losses may play a role. First, the
asymmetric treatment of tax losses may affect the extent of managerial inefficien-
cies, which would then feed back on the market for corporate control. Second, the
transferability of tax losses affects the market for corporate control per se. These
two effects are assessed in the light of modern theories of managerial inefficiencies
and the market for corporate control.
There are basically two different theories of the market for corporate control as it
relates to managerial inefficiencies. The first theory is the standard one that the
separation of ownership and control creates inefficiencies that may be corrected
via the market for corporate control which acts as a watch dog, contributing to
the improvement of the efficiency of the economy. The second theory argues that
the market for corporate control creates a short-term bias in managerial decision-
making, thus exacerbating managerial inefficiencies. These two theories produce
different conclusions as to whether an active market for corporate control is a
good thing or not. I now explain in turn these two theories and relate them to the
issue of the treatment of tax losses.
1.1. Managerial inefficiencies and the market for corporate
control
The following arguments are mostly due to Grossman and Hart (1980) and Scharf-
stein (1988). A manager controls a firm’s assets which generate a random cash
flow. The manager can influence the distribution of this cash flow through his
effort and/or efficient decision making. For example, the manager may put more
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effort into the evaluation of projects to ensure that his decisions are the right ones.
Alternatively, the manager may be tempted to invest in projects that are personally
important, such as “empire-building” investments, but that are not profitable to
the firm. Furthermore, the assets under the manager’s control may be worth more
to a third party, that is, there may be synergy gains emerging from a takeover by
this third party. The value of the assets is thus determined by managerial discretion
and potential synergy gains.
A raider who may bring about these synergy gains has gathered a lot of informa-
tion about the manager’s behavior, and he therefore knows whether a takeover is
profitable or not. He would like to take the firm over when these synergy gains are
positive, that is, when the assets are worth more under his control than under the
manager’s control. Whether such efficiency is attained depends on informational
assumptions about the manager’s actions. Before considering different assump-
tions, it is important to explain how a takeover can take place.
Suppose first that the takeover price is determined through bargaining with the
existing shareholders. The price offered by the raider must be such that he expects
a capital gain from the transaction. The shareholders know, however, that if a
raider has come along, there must be synergy gains to be realized. Given this, why
should anyone sell at the offered price if they can appropriate the capital gain by
waiting for the raider to take control and implement changes that should increase
the firm’s value. Grossman and Hart (1980) have argued that a takeover is like a
public good that produces value for all shareholders, and that, individually, they all
have incentives not to sell, or, in other words, to hold out. Given that they all hold
out, no takeover can ever take place with the result that potential synergy gains
are not achieved. Grossman and Hart (1980) have argued that corporate charters
can be used to dilute the value of a minority share, thus providing incentive for
shareholders to tender their shares. The optimal degree of dilution trades off the
probability of being taken over with the expected price that such dilution entails.
Using the corporate charter, shareholders play the role of a price-setting monopolist
that must trade-off a higher price with the probability of selling. We now explain
how the market for corporate control works under different assumptions about the
information shareholders have about the manager’s actions.
Suppose first that shareholders can monitor perfectly the manager’s actions. In this
case, all managerial inefficiencies are eliminated by shareholders’ monitoring and
activism. Takeovers can only occur for the realization of synergy gains. For a given
degree of dilution chosen in the charter, takeovers will occur for sufficiently large
synergy gains that offset the opportunistic behavior of shareholders. In general,
there are too few takeovers as the market for corporate control cannot generate all
socially optimal takeovers.
Can the fiscal treatment of tax losses improve economic efficiency ? First, the
asymmetric treatment of tax losses per se is not likely to alter significantly the
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degree of discretion the manager exerts on the assets under his control. Second,
the transferability of tax losses may, however, affect the incidence of takeovers. In
this simple example, there is under supply of takeovers. There is, therefore, a case
to be made for “subsidizing” takeovers compared to a neutral policy. A neutral
policy would restrict the speed of use of tax losses to that prior to the takeover.
It may also restrict the line of business in which losses could be used following a
takeover. In the present case, an optimal policy should move away from neutrality
to encourage more takeovers. Moving towards full transferability of tax losses
would be one instrument to increase the financial gains and hence, produce more
takeovers. Relaxing restrictions on the speed of use of tax losses should also help.
Having a non-neutral policy is socially desirable. Of course, whether one wants to
allow full transferability, or put no restrictions at all on the speed of use, depends
on empirical issues that go beyond the scope of this research.
I now turn to the more interesting case where the shareholders cannot or do not
monitor the manager’s actions, and the raider has the information about the ma-
nager’s actions. Suppose that the manager has shirked. The price of the firm’s
share is accordingly low. Shareholders, however, cannot distinguish between the
case where the manager has shirked and the case where demand is low. The raider
can, however, distinguish between these two cases. The probability of takeover
is therefore higher when the manager has shirked. The manager anticipates this
outcome on the market for corporate control. Since he gets nothing in the advent
of a takeover, he is reluctant to shirk. The threat of takeover therefore disciplines
the manager in limiting his discretion over the firm’s assets. The key assumption
that ensures that takeovers have a disciplinary role is that the raider can monitor
the manager’s actions, which then makes the occurrence of takeovers correlated
with the manager’s behavior. This is not an unrealistic assumption as many rai-
ders usually gather firm-specific information about their potential targets before
bidding for them.
Is there a policy role for the treatment of tax losses ? Again, asymmetric taxation
is not likely to play a major role here. Transferable tax losses should affect the
probability of a takeover by increasing potential financial gains. Consequently, as
in the previous case, subsidizing takeovers by moving away from a neutral policy
may enhance economic efficiency since there are too few takeovers in equilibrium.
Whether this influences the incentives of the manager to maximize firm’s value or
not is hard to evaluate. It depends on the distribution of synergy gains, an issue
on which it is hard to obtain specific conclusions.
To summarize, the asymmetric treatment of tax losses cannot play a major role
in restoring managerial incentives under the threat of takeovers. A non-neutral
policy with regards to the transferability of tax losses would increase the number
of actual takeovers for synergy reasons, which would be socially desirable. Any
judgment along these lines should, however, be deferred until takeovers in the
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context of product market competition are analyzed. Before doing so, however, I
present the other theory of the market for corporate control that emphasizes the
short-term bias of financial markets.
1.2. Managerial myopia and the market for corporate control
The informal business press often stresses that pressure from financial markets
forces managers into maximizing current earnings to the expense of longer term
objectives. This reduces firm value. The argument is even pushed to suggest that
this short-term bias puts North American economies at a disadvantage compared
with European or Japanese economies where financial pressure is much less, and
therefore, where firms maximize long-term value. Even though these arguments
were more popular when North American economies were not performing as well
as now compared to their foreign rivals, I think they still deserve some attention.
The folk response to the short-term argument was that if a firm was indeed sa-
crificing long-term gains for short-run profits, it would be taken over by a raider
who would restore economic efficiency. Consequently, managerial short-term bias
cannot exist when the market itself has no short-run bias. Furthermore, ample
evidence of rational financial markets is found in the literature (for a survey of
this evidence, see Jensen, 1988).
One potential example of this argument is that financial markets react positively
to the announcement that a firm increases its R&D expenditures (its share price
increases following the announcement). This is taken as evidence that financial
markets correctly value the longer term. Recently, however, Stein (1988, 1989) has
convincingly argued that this evidence is not inconsistent with the presence of a
short-run bias in managerial decision making. He argues that, if managers focus
too much on the short term, more R&D becomes a good signal that the firm is
undertaking a long-term investment, and therefore, the stock price should react
positively.1
Stein’s theory is now explained. Two assumptions are essential for this result to
hold. First, managers must care about the firm’s current share price. This assump-
tion is easy to justify. It may be that the manager is partly compensated by shares
of the firm. Or, it may be that the manager needs to finance new investments with
equity issues, so that he prefers a higher price to a lower price in order not to
dilute too much existing shareholders’ ownership. It may also be that the manager
is averse to the firm being taken over, and a higher share price minimizes the likeli-
hood of a takeover. The second necessary assumption is that financial investors do
not know the firm’s precise value or growth potential. They infer this information
from the firm’s current earnings.
1 I should also point out that I am aware of no empirical study that has tried to test these two competing arguments,
which makes the efficiency analysis of takeovers problematic.
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Under these assumptions, the challenge facing managers is to maximize a weighted
sum of today’s and tomorrow’s share price. To do so, managers can choose projects
that have high current earnings but low future prospects, or projects costly in the
short run but more profitable in the long run. Stein (1989) shows that the more
the manager cares about today’s share price, the more he distorts investments in
favor of the short run. The manager has a short-run bias which adversely affects
the firm’s value. In equilibrium, rational financial investors are not fooled and
the firm’s value is correctly assessed taking into account that the manager has
distorted investment. The manager, however, is caught in a kind of prisoner’s
dilemma. Given the financial investors’ expectations that he will boost current
earnings, failure to do so will result in investors thinking that the firm has lower
value than it really has, thus exacerbating the problem. In equilibrium, it is as
if the manager was behaving myopically favoring current earnings rather than
maximizing firm’s value.
This theory can be related to managerial efficiency and takeovers. The higher the
probability of takeovers, the more myopically does the manager behave. Hence, in
this theory, takeovers are more detrimental than beneficial to the firm’s long-term
value.2
Stein (1988) considers the trade-off between the synergistic value of takeovers
with their cost in terms of managerial short-run bias and asks whether takeovers
should be favored or not. He shows that if raiders are informed about the long-
term prospects of the firm, takeovers always lead to an improvement in economic
efficiency when managers care about the long-term value of the firm.3 When
raiders are uninformed, managers may be tempted to boost current earnings if
they expect shareholders to be pessimistic when confronted with a low current
share price. In that case, synergy gains are eliminated by the myopic behavior of
the manager, and takeovers are detrimental to economic efficiency.
To summarize, “rational” managerial myopia can be motivated by the fact that
managers care about a firm’s share price and that they are better informed about the
firm’s long-term value. In such environment, takeovers are generally detrimental
to economic efficiency. This conclusion must, however, be qualified once synergy
gains are taken into account. Whether takeovers are beneficial or not depends on
whether one believes that raiders are usually better informed than other financial
investors about the long-term value of the firm. This is surely not an unrealistic
assumption.
Is there a role for the treatment of tax losses in this environment ? First, it should
be noted that given that managers signal their firm’s value by boosting current
earnings, losses become less likely in equilibrium than if managers were under-
2 It should be noted that no synergy gains have been incorporated in the analysis so far.
3 If they also care about being in control, they may be tempted to boost current earnings (and the current share price)
to discourage any raider.
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taking long-term investments. Second, a non-neutral policy with respect to the
transferability of tax losses again can become an instrument for restoring the so-
cially optimal supply of takeovers. Different cases are considered. Without synergy
gains, takeovers reduce economic efficiency, which implies that takeovers should
be discouraged to reduce managerial myopia. This could partly be achieved by
moving away from a neutral policy and restricting the transferability of tax losses
upon change of control. Restrictions could then be placed on the line of business
and the speed of use of tax losses following the takeover.
When significant synergy gains are present, however, takeovers play an important
role in placing assets in the hands of the agents that value them most. As Stein
(1988) shows, takeovers play that role optimally as long as raiders are informed
of the firm’s long-term prospects. If managers value the long run, takeovers are
optimal and a neutral policy for the transferability of tax losses is desirable. Losses
should be allowed to be transferred to raiders that are likely to have synergy gains
with the firm in question. And, tax losses should also be used at the same speed as
prior to the takeover. This can be achieved by putting in place a policy similar to
that of the U.S. (see Section A.2 in the Appendix for details). The American policy
restricts the speed of use of tax losses to that which would have occurred had no
takeover taken place. In any given year, losses can only be used up to the acquired
firm’s fair market value of equity times the long-term return on federal bonds. This
implies that losses used cannot exceed the acquired firm’s equity value over time.
This policy is therefore successful in restricting the speed of use of losses following
a takeover.
If, however, managers value control or give value to current share price, then
takeovers fail to achieve full efficiency. In that case, a non-neutral policy that
moves toward full transferability of losses and relaxes speed of use restrictions
may improve economic efficiency by reducing the cost to the raider of taking over
the firm.
1.3. Other considerations
In this section, I survey other considerations that are relevant for takeovers.
Shleifer and Summers (1988) have argued that an undesirable consequence of
takeovers is that they breach implicit contracts among the firm’s stakeholders.
Raiders would benefit from the takeovers by “stealing” rents from workers, share-
holders or bondholders. If the threat of takeovers is sufficiently high, agents may
underinvest in firm-specific human capital for fear of being held up by a raider. In
that case, takeovers would generally cause inefficiencies. I do not think this argu-
ment should influence public policy regarding takeovers for the following reasons.
First, there are many means for breaking implicit contracts, a takeover being but
one of them. For example, it has been argued that firms have used outsourcing of
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formerly vertically integrated activities to steal workers’ rents and lower the wage
bill. Secondly, golden parachutes have been designed to protect managerial rents
in case of a takeover. Consequently, breach-of-trust arguments as put forth by
Shleifer and Summers (1988) should not influence tax policy regarding takeovers.
Jensen (1986) has argued that an important conflict between managers and sha-
reholders concerns the disposition of the firm’s free cash flow. Managers have a
tendency to keep resources within the firm by investing in low (or negative) NPV
projects rather than pay dividends. Leveraged takeovers can then restore efficiency
as debt becomes a commitment to pay out free cash flow to bondholders in the
form of interest payments. A firm with free cash flow is likely to have been profi-
table in the past. Given asymmetric tax treatment of losses, its losses then produce
tax refunds. Such tax treatment may then exacerbate the free cash flow problem,
and require more drastic solutions.
1.4. Conclusion
What does the efficiency of the market for corporate control teaches us about
the optimal policy for transferability of tax losses ? The only instances where a
non-neutral policy could potentially play a role are the following.
1. If corporate charters set dilution parameters to encourage takeovers and maxi-
mize shareholders’ gains from doing so, then there are too few takeovers, and
they could be encouraged via a non-neutral policy that removes restrictions on
line of business and speed of use of losses.
2. If synergy gains are small, takeovers induce myopic behavior and should the-
refore be discouraged (or not encouraged). Hence, tax losses should not be
transferable.
3. If synergy gains are large and raiders are well informed, the occurrence of
takeovers is optimal, and the transferability of tax losses is not an issue. A
neutral policy is then optimal with line of business restrictions and limited
speed of use.
This analysis seems to be in accordance with empirical investigations that show
that tax losses do not have a significant impact on the incidence of takeovers
(see Auerbach and Reihus, 1988). According to theory, tax losses can only play at
the margin. Given that takeovers are costly and that tax losses are usually small
compared with these costs and synergy gains, they cannot play a significant role
in most cases.
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2. Competition in product markets
The analysis of the effects of tax losses on product market competition is split
between competitive and imperfectly competitive markets.
2.1. Competitive markets
In competitive markets, Appelbaum and Katz (1987) study the effect of the asym-
metric treatment of tax losses on the structure and efficiency of a competitive
economy. By assumption, all firms are price takers. The authors show that the
asymmetric treatment of losses increases the effective marginal cost the firm is
facing. The intuition for this result is the following. When losses are treated sym-
metrically, firms choose output by equating expected price with their marginal cost
of production. When losses are treated asymmetrically (and they can occur with
positive probability), firms take into account the fact that losses do not generate
a tax refund. They then reduce output to reduce the probability of being in a loss
state. Consequently, in the market equilibrium, price is higher than marginal cost
even though each firm produces at the minimum of their average-cost curve.4
Given that the industry equilibrium is inefficient, is there a role for takeovers
to restore efficiency ? The answer to this question depends on the definition of
neutrality that one adopts. If we use the narrow definition of neutrality, then tax
losses should not be transferable upon a takeover since the only inefficiency arises
from the economy-wide non-transferability of tax losses.
If, however, one adopts a broader definition of neutrality (that would imply no
distortions due to the asymmetric treatment of tax losses), then tax losses transfe-
rability upon takeovers may undo (or partially offset) the inefficiency due to the
asymmetric treatment of tax losses. This inefficiency implies that industry-wide
costs are not minimized at the competitive equilibrium. A restructuring of assets
within the industry reduces total costs if tax losses are transferable. Furthermore,
removing restrictions regarding the line of business in which they can be used
would most likely be efficient. The reason is the following. In competitive indus-
tries, losses are more likely to emerge from industry-wide shocks, meaning that the
occurrence of losses is correlated across firms. If tax losses are transferable only to
firms in the same line of business, takeovers have little effect on efficiency since
the losses are not likely to be used by any other firm. There would therefore be too
few takeovers. On the contrary, if tax losses are transferable without restrictions, a
firm in another industry could take over a firm and use the losses against its profits
in unrelated business. Such takeovers would be more likely to occur with a raider
4 The equilibrium configuration is similar to one where the product would be taxed. Firms face a higher marginal cost
due to the tax and there is an efficiency loss due to the reduction in output.
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and a target for which profits are negatively correlated to maximize the probability
of using the tax losses. Finally, the speed of use for losses following the takeover
should not be significantly increased in order not to encourage too many takeo-
vers. Since takeovers are costly, however, it may be desirable to increase it slightly
to make sure takeover costs do not excessively discourage takeover activity.
As the experience of the 1980’s suggests, however, takeovers for the purpose of
diversification are not well perceived by financial markets. The general belief seems
to be that diversification can be made at the shareholders’ level rather than at the
corporate level. Can diversification for tax purposes follow the same logic ? Not
precisely. Shareholders cannot use a firm’s tax losses. There are, however, other
means of transferring losses such as leasing and preferred share financing (see Jog,
1991, for a recent survey).5 Whether these means are preferred or not to takeovers
is an empirical question. Finally, takeovers in competitive industries should always
be closely monitored to ensure that they do not confer market power to any new
firm. If one firm gained some market power, the inefficiency that would arise from
the exercise of that power would have to be weighed against the efficiency gain
arising from the elimination of the asymmetric tax treatment.
To summarize, in competitive industries, to maintain tax neutrality (in a narrow
sense), tax losses transferability should not be allowed. A broader definition of
neutrality may yield a different result, but then it is relevant to ask why not remove
the asymmetric treatment of tax losses instead of allowing full transferability upon
a takeover if the purpose is to remove tax distortions.
2.2. Imperfectly competitive markets
Two issues are worth discussing in imperfectly competitive markets. First, what is
the role of tax asymmetries on the degree of competition and entry in imperfect
product markets, and what role can a takeover play in such environment. Second,
takeovers can help restructure an oligopolistic industry. Should such restructuring
be encouraged or discouraged via tax losses transferability ?
Appelbaum and Katz (1996) asymmetries on behavior and entry in oligopolistic
industries. The starting point of their analysis is the fact that tax asymmetries
may affect different firms differently (see Jog and Mintz, 1989). The difference
comes from the fact that different firms have different profit and loss history
which conditions their current tax bill. As is the case with firms in competitive
environments, tax asymmetries affect a firm’s post-tax marginal cost. If a firm’s
past profitability affects its marginal cost, it also affects the nature of competition
in an oligopolistic industry.
5 Jog notes that the use of preferred share financing to transfer tax losses is now subject to more restriction.
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Past profits or losses increase a firm’s expected value by reducing current expected
tax liabilities. If a firm with past profits incurs losses, it can get a refund on tax
paid on past profits, and if a firm with past losses makes profits, it can reduce
its tax bill by deducting past losses from its current profits. This means that new
firms in an industry are at a disadvantage compared with established firms that
are likely to have past profits or losses that may be used against current losses or
profits. One may think that tax asymmetries act as a barrier to entry for new firms
in an industry. As we will see, this conclusion may be wrong. In some cases, tax
asymmetries may put incumbents at a disadvantage compared to an entrant.
I first consider the case where firms fix their prices for long periods of time and
thus compete in quantities (Cournot competition). Under Cournot competition, a
firm gains from acting aggressively as it forces its rivals to assume a less dominant
or aggressive stance. An aggressive firm can then increase its market share to the
detriment of its rivals. I then contrast the results with those in an industry where
firms compete in prices (Bertrand competition). Under Bertrand competition, a firm
does not gain from acting aggressively as it would also induce its rivals to behave
aggressively. A firm then has the incentive to increase its price since it expects its
rivals to follow and increase their price also. As we will see, results are sensitive
to the nature of competition.
Suppose first that firms compete in quantities. Assume that the incumbent has
accumulated past profits. These past profits reduce the burden of the fiscal asym-
metry as the incumbent can now get a tax refund if he has current losses. This
biases the incumbent’s behavior towards favoring the loss region. Consequently,
the incumbent can afford to be more aggressive and it produces more. The entrant
expecting this aggressivity responds by lowering its own output. Accumulated past
profits act as barrier to entry in that they induce the incumbent to be aggressive
if the entrant enters the industry. Suppose that accumulated profits are a sign of
profitability for an industry. The tax asymmetry is then likely to heighten the level
of barriers to entry that make this industry highly profitable.
Suppose now that the incumbent has accumulated losses. As above, these past
losses reduce the burden of the asymmetry as the incumbent can now escape
taxation if it has current profits. This biases the incumbent’s behavior towards
favoring the profit region. There are two competing effects. First, the incumbent
is less taxed, and it therefore wants to produce more. Second, it favors the profit
region, so it wants to reduce the variance of profits by producing less. In general,
the overall effect cannot be signed. For a small accumulated loss, the variance-
reduction effect dominates and the incumbent reduces output. Losses then have
a collusive aspect. The incumbent is then at a competitive disadvantage compa-
red with the entrant. In that case, a small loss acts as an enhancement to entry
rather than a barrier to entry. If past losses are an indication of the profitability
of an industry, then entry is not as likely in an industry where firms would have
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accumulated past losses. This case may not be as empirically relevant. If, howe-
ver, past losses are an indication of tax incentives available in the industry, entry
may be likely. In that case, the tax asymmetry would encourage entry beyond tax
incentives.
Now suppose that firms compete in prices. When the incumbent has accumulated
past profits, the burden of the fiscal asymmetry is reduced as the incumbent can
now get a tax refund if he has current losses. This biases the incumbent’s behavior
towards favoring the loss region. Consequently, the incumbent can afford to be
more aggressive : it therefore charges a lower price. The entrant expecting this
aggressivity responds by lowering its own price. Again, accumulated past profits
act as barrier to entry in that they induce the incumbent to be aggressive in the
case of entry. Since entry is more likely in profitable industries (i.e., industries
where incumbents have accumulated past profits), the tax asymmetry is likely to
have important effects on entry in this case.
When the incumbent has accumulated losses, the burden of the fiscal asymmetry
is lowered as the incumbent can now escape taxation if he realizes current profits.
This biases the incumbent’s behavior towards favoring the profit region. There
are two competing effects. First, the incumbent is less taxed, and it therefore
wants to charge a lower price to increase its profits. Second, it favors the profit
region, so it wants to reduce the variance of profits by charging a higher price.
In general, the overall effect cannot be signed. For a small accumulated loss, the
variance-reduction effect dominates and the incumbent charges a higher price.
The incumbent is then strategically disadvantaged compared with the entrant. In
that case, a small loss acts as an enhancement to entry rather than a barrier to
entry. If, however, past losses are an indication of the profitability of an industry,
then entry is not as likely in an industry where firms would have accumulated past
losses. This cas e may not be as empirically relevant.
Before discussing tax loss transferability, it should be noted that the above results
were derived in a static model of the world. In a dynamic model, the effects of
initial conditions often vanish rapidly. Whether they would affect the nature of
competition and entry significantly would depend on time preferences and the
availability of external financing to smooth out early losses.6
Past profits create distortions in oligopolistic industries by artificially affecting the
nature of competition.7 Past profits are likely to favor the incumbent. For example,
an entrant with lower costs than an incumbent could still be at a competitive
disadvantage if the incumbent has accumulated past profits and the entrant has
no profit history. As we saw above, the entrant’s effective marginal cost would be
higher than the incumbent’s, therefore placing the entrant in an adverse strategic
6 I discuss in the next section the interaction between financing decisions and the treatment of tax losses.
7 Past losses may have opposite effects. I focus on past profits as they probably are the most relevant case to treat when
entry is analyzed. Past losses may actually be a signal not to enter an industry, unless they indicate tax incentives
available in the industry.
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position. Small entrants are then strategically disadvantaged not only because their
effective after-tax marginal cost is high, but also because the incumbent’s is low.
In an oligopoly, these two factors make the incumbent strategically aggressive.
Under Cournot competition, entry is then more likely to be successful if the entrant
has profits from other lines of business since the existence of past profits makes
the entrant more aggressive. The tax asymmetry then favors entry by mature firms
in unrelated industries. If tax losses are transferable without restrictions, there are
also incentives for a profitable firm in an unrelated line of business to take over an
entrant. The takeover not only generates tax savings gains, but also gains in terms
of market share as the entrant now becomes more aggressive. A potential downside
to such takeover, from the point of view of the raider’s other businesses, is that
the raider sees its accumulated profits for tax purposes be lowered. Depending
on the degree and nature of competition in these other industries, this may have
adverse strategic consequences which would then have to weighted against the
gains. Below, I discuss more specifically these effects.
Under Bertrand competition, an entrant would like to enter without past profits for
tax purposes. Past profits would make this entrant more aggressive, which would
then force the incumbent to also be more aggressive. In that case, an entrant
with past profits would have no strategic advantage over a new firm.8 Takeovers
between a new entrant and a profitable firm in an unrelated line of business are
not as likely as under Cournot competition as the tax savings have to be weighed
against the lost profitability of the new venture. The potential effects on the raider’s
other line of business would also have to be taken into account.
Before discussing the optimal policy regarding tax losses transferability (in the
next section), I assess whether the presence of transferable tax losses create in-
centives for mergers between firms with losses and firms with profits or not. The
occurrence of mergers is not trivial to analyze in imperfectly competitive markets.
If, in competitive markets, a takeover can be evaluated solely on the basis of the
tax savings that would accrue to the merging parties, in oligopolistic markets,
such analysis is complicated by the fact that the tax status of a firm alters its own
behavior and that of its rivals. For example, suppose that an incumbent with past
profits takes over another firm with past losses. Suppose that these losses were
slightly larger than the first firm’s past profits. The aggregate tax status (small
losses) of the new entity makes it compete less aggressively than the first firm was
competing before. There are two basic cases to consider.
In an industry where firms fix prices for long periods (Cournot competition), ri-
vals compete more aggressively, which is detrimental to the merging firms. Such
takeover then has to be evaluated weighing the tax savings against the loss of mar-
8 It may nonetheless have cost or financing advantages which are abstracted from for the sake of the argument. See,
for example, Poitevin (1989).
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ket power (and possibly market share).9 The nature of competition in a Cournot
industry is likely to reduce the number of mergers for tax purposes.
In an industry where firms adjust prices in the short run (Bertrand competition),
such takeovers are more likely to occur. When firms compete in prices, a reduction
in a firm’s price induces its rivals to also reduce their price. The takeover makes
the new entity less aggressive in price competition, thus charging a higher price.
Its rivals then respond by also increasing their prices. The resulting equilibrium
has firms charging higher prices and earning higher profits. The takeover of the
two firms results in a more collusive industry. In that case, the tax savings motive
for takeover is reinforced by the increased collusion in the industry. In industries
where firms compete in prices, there is an increased motive for merger due to the
asymmetric fiscal treatment of losses.
2.3. Effects of mergers in imperfectly competitive industries
As we saw above, mergers in imperfectly competitive industries are likely to have
significant impact on the extent of competition. I now step back for a moment and
put aside taxation issues to explain the welfare effects of mergers in oligopolies.
This is necessary to assess whether merger activity should be taxed or subsidized,
possibly through the regulation of the transferability of tax losses.
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) have studied extensively the effect of mergers on welfare
in a Cournot industry.10 At first, a merger may appear to lower welfare in an
imperfectly competitive industry as it increases concentration, hence market power.
This may be an erroneous conclusion as a merger may help rationalize production
in an industry. If all firms have the same constant marginal cost of production, a
merger always increases market price and lowers social welfare. If, however, firms
differ in their cost of production (a likely outcome in imperfectly competitive
industries), a merger may help rationalize production. Keeping aggregate output
fixed, a merger may reduce the total costs of production in the industry by shifting
some production from a high-cost firm to a low-cost firm. This is not the end of
the story, however. Following the merger, firms adjust their behavior to the new
industry structure. The contribution of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) is to determine
the conditions under which the rationalization effect dominates any market power
effect. I now summarize their results and then apply them to our taxation issues.
If a merger generates no cost synergy, then market price increases. In that case,
reducing the number of firms only serves to increase market concentration, which
results in a higher price. This implies that synergies are necessary for a merger to
result in a lower market price. The next step is to show that even if the market price
9 The discussion as to whether such takeover is socially beneficial or not is delayed to the end of this section.
10 Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surpluses and firm profits.
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increases following the merger, there are conditions under which social welfare is
increasing. When the price increases, consumers are hurt by a takeover as total
demand is reduced (and price is above the marginal cost of production of the most
efficient firm). Rivals, however, can react to this merger. Since the new merged firm
becomes less aggressive than the sum of its parts, rivals increase production, hence
their market share and profits.11 In some cases, this increase in profits is sufficient
to outweigh the consumers’ losses. For example, if the elasticity of demand is
constant and equal to ǫ in absolute value, and if all firms have constant marginal
costs, then a (small) merger between firms 1 and 2 that raises the market price is
socially desirable if and only if
2(s1 + s2) < 1−
(
1 +
1
ǫ
) ∑
i∈O
s2i ,
where si is the pre-merger market share of firm i, and O is the set of outsiders to
the merger.
Figure 1
11 Note that this is not inconsistent with the two original firms wanting to merge, since they gain from the price increase.
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The only mergers that are likely to take place are those which generate positive
profits for the merging firms. Merger participants do not take into account the
effect of the merger on consumer surpluses and rivals’ profits. There is thus an
externality that is not taken into account in the decision. The sign of the externality
depends on the case at hand. Consider Figure 1. On the vertical axis is the change
in profits of the merging firms. On the horizontal axis is the size of the externality
on consumers and rivals. All mergers that give an outcome above the negatively-
sloped 45◦ line are socially desirable. Mergers in regions B, C, and D are privately
optimal. If antitrust authorities can evaluate the social desirability of a merger,
all mergers in region D should be blocked by the Competition Bureau. Mergers in
region A do not privately happen given that it is not in the interest of the merging
parties to pursue such venture. This implies that, if antitrust authorities can screen
for socially desirable mergers, there is an under supply of mergers in a Cournot
oligopoly.
The optimal policy for transferability of tax losses should therefore be non-neutral.
If tax losses are transferable only to similar lines of business, mergers within the
industry would be subsidized and social welfare would be increased when such
mergers would take place. Transferability without restrictions would not be an
improvement since it would not necessarily encourage mergers that rationalize
production. In that case, it would be preferable to restrict the use of tax losses to
firms in the same line of business. Relaxing restrictions on the speed of use of
tax losses following the merger would also serve to encourage mergers, especially
when mergers are costly.
Unfortunately, no welfare analysis seems to exist for firms competing in prices.
Such analysis would be complicated by the fact that goods would not be homo-
geneous.12
I now use that intuition to reassess mergers in a Cournot industry when firms
face tax asymmetries. As I established earlier, firms have reduced incentives for
merging when they want to arbitrage tax bills because of the adverse strategic effect
of reducing past profits. As just discussed, without asymmetries, there are likely to
be too few mergers for production rationalization in Cournot industries. This only
reinforces the argument for a non-neutral policy that allows the transferability of
tax losses for mergers in the same line of business (possibly with few restrictions
on the speed of use of tax losses by the acquirer).
In Bertrand industries, no general analysis exists of the welfare effects of mergers.
Without taking into account the rationalization argument, a (narrowly defined)
neutral policy would not allow for the transferability of tax losses as the only
other source of inefficiencies is due to the asymmetric treatment of tax losses.
Furthermore, mergers of tax losses have anticompetitive effects.
12 If they were, the industry would be perfectly competitive.
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2.4. Conclusion
What does the efficiency of product market competition teaches us about the
optimal policy for the transferability of tax losses ?
1. In competitive industries, a (narrowly defined) neutral policy is desirable in
which no tax losses can be transferred upon a merger.
2. In imperfectly competitive industries, results depend on industrial structure. In
Cournot industries, moving away from a neutral policy is desirable to increase
the number of welfare-increasing mergers. This can be achieved by allowing tax
losses transferability within the same line of business and possibly allow faster
use of tax losses by the acquirer.
3. In Bertrand industries, a neutral policy is preferred to avoid anticompetitive
mergers (this abstracts from potential synergy gains).
As is often the case in industrial organization theory, conclusions are sensitive to
assumptions about industrial structure. It is therefore difficult to assess different
policies. Whether firms in a given industry compete in prices or quantities becomes
an empirical question, which is clearly outside the scope of this paper.
3. Financial decisions
Tax asymmetries have implications for the optimal financial structure of a firm.
Suppose that there are no tax asymmetries. The optimal debt–equity ratio of a
decent size firm trades off the corporate tax advantage of debt and the expected
bankruptcy costs in the event of default.13 More debt yields tax savings through
the interest rate deductions, while it also increases the probability of bankruptcy.
Since bankruptcy can be quite costly in terms of legal fees, lost business, delayed
or canceled investments, firms typically limit the amount of debt they take on.
Equity usually provides the remaining necessary financing.14
Small and some medium-size firms do not have access to formal equity markets,
either for informational reasons or because access to these markets is quite costly.
These firms are then financed basically only through debt and bank loans. Fur-
thermore, these small firms often do not generate large enough profits to benefit
fully from the interest rate deductions.
13 There have been numerous refinements and extensions of this basic theory of financial structure. For example, many
theories stress the informational role of financial structure and abstract from tax considerations. I do feel that these
theories are quite specialized and not necessarily relevant for this paper. Harris and Raviv (1991) provide an excellent
survey of recent theories of financial structure.
14 I abstract here from the issues of personal taxation. In a more complete settings, firms would choose financial policy
to minimize the total (corporate and personal) tax bill.
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3.1. Optimal financial structure with tax asymmetries
With an asymmetric treatment of tax losses, firms with accumulated past losses
may face a different trade-off between debt and equity than a firm with past
profits. Past losses reduce significantly the current tax bill. Debt then loses its tax
advantage. Firms having access to the equity market may reduce their debt–equity
ratio to reduce their expected bankruptcy costs. This is not a trivial operation,
and past losses must be significant before a firm undertakes such venture. A firm
with past profits has the opposite incentive of raising its debt–equity ratio since
expected tax savings are greater the larger are accumulated profits.
Takeovers are often seen as a means of restoring a firm’s optimal financial structure.
The wave of LBOs in the 1980s is believed to have been motivated in part by the
desire to increase the debt–equity ratio of target firms. Patry and Poitevin (1991)
documents a few Canadian cases of hostile takeovers where tax considerations
were an important determinant of the takeover decision.
If the asymmetric treatment of tax losses creates distortions in the firm’s financial
structure, then allowing for the transferability of tax losses is likely to help correct
for this distortion. For example, a firm with accumulated tax losses may have to
reduce its debt beyond the optimal level. A takeover involving a profitable firm
would restore the optimal level as these past losses would be passed on to the raider,
thereby restoring the target’s incentives to borrow to trade-off the tax savings of
debt and the expected bankruptcy costs. There is not a strong case here to put
restrictions on the transferability of losses. Optimality of financial structure would
dictate allowing transferability without restrictions on the line of business.15
A similar logic would hold for a small firm that would have accumulated losses.
In that case, the distortions do not result in the wrong debt–equity ratio, since the
firm has difficulty financing through equity, but in excessive risk borne by the
firm. The transfer of its tax losses to a profitable firm would reduce that risk as
it would share in the gains from the tax savings. Again, transferability improves
efficiency, and there is not a strong case for restrictions on transferability.
If, however, we stick to the narrow definition of neutrality, then transferability of
tax losses cannot be invoked since the only distortions are due to the asymmetric
treatment of tax losses. A neutral policy without transferability should therefore
be preferred.
Finally, suppose that the preferred tax treatment given to debt financing induces
firms to take on too much debt, thereby exposing themselves to a socially ineffi-
cient level of risk of bankruptcy (with its associated bankruptcy and agency costs).
Then, a non-neutral policy may be an optimal response. It is, however, difficult to
assess what this policy should be. On the one hand, not allowing transferability
of tax losses would induce a loss firm to take on less debt as it would lose its
15 Below, I consider the strategic aspect of debt which may alter this conclusion.
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tax advantage. On the other hand, allowing transferability may help contribute
to reduce the fiscal advantage of debt for firms that would acquire these losses.
The first policy would create large asymmetries across firms with respect to the
incentives to use debt. The second policy would go towards smoothing out these
asymmetries across firms. It becomes an empirical question as to which is socially
better.
3.2. The dynamics of financing
The above arguments rest on a static view of the world where default on a loan
leads to bankruptcy or at least to a costly reorganization phase. There is a recent
literature on dynamic financing models that abstract from these bankruptcy costs
to focus on the dynamics of financing, explicitly assuming that even if a firm
defaults on its financial obligations, it is still refinanced because, looking ahead,
it still has positive net present value. There are two classes of models that consider
the problem of financing a risk-averse firm.
In the first class, financial structure matters because neither the firm nor the fi-
nancier can commit to future transfers. The firm cannot commit to reimburse if
bankruptcy is a more profitable course of action, while the financier cannot commit
to refinance if it does not expect a high enough return from these new investments.
The dynamics of the relationship between the firm and the financier without com-
mitment have been studied by Thomas and Worrall (1988), Gauthier, Poitevin, and
Gonzalez (1997) and Kocherlakota (1996a, 1996b). The basic intuition is that the
financial contract must ensure that, at any point in the relationship, both parties
find it in their own interest not to break the relationship, meaning that the firm
reimburses the bank when profits are high, and the bank continues its financing
of the firm when profits are low.
The distortions are created in these models by the lack of commitment of the two
agents. The nature of these distortions is that the firm cannot insure completely
against random shocks to its profits. It is easy to show that the larger the collateral
the firm can put up against its loans, the smaller the distortions. As the firm’s
collateral increases, defaulting becomes less valuable for the firm. It then has
more incentives to maintain the relationship, thus improving risk sharing.
Allowing tax losses to be transferable is like increasing the firm’s collateral. If
these tax losses are lost by the firm (but used by the financier) in the event of
bankruptcy, they act as an effective collateral to help the firm secure financing
more easily. It should then contribute to reduce risk-sharing distortions created
by non-commitment problems. Again, there is not an issue of whether tax losses
are transferred in the same line of business or not. Financing distortions can
therefore be alleviated with a non-neutral policy for the transferability of tax
losses which creates valuable collateral. Maximal collateral is created when there
e´conomiepublique
175
recherches Michel Poitevin
are few restrictions on the line of business where tax losses can be used and few
restrictions on the speed of use of the transferred tax losses.
In the second class of models, distortions in financial structure come from the
fact that the financier cannot observe whether the firm is profitable or not. The
firm may claim that its profits are low to avoid repaying completely the financier.
Incentives to repay are restored by increasing the firm’s debt if it does not repay
fully today. Green (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990) have studied the specifics
of this model.
If tax losses are transferable in such environment, they become an alternative
source of risk-sharing for the firm. Transferable tax losses are then like “rene-
gotiation” in incentive problems. They would then make truth-telling constraints
more stringent, thus increasing the cost of financing of the firm. The same argu-
ment would hold in a static model of costly state-verification à la Townsend (1979)
or Gale and Hellwig (1985). If you reduce the cost of defaulting by allowing the firm
to sell its tax losses, it becomes more difficult to convince the firm to reimburse
its debt. It would then be preferable not to allow tax losses transferability.16
3.3. Strategic aspects of financial structure
As we saw in the last section, tax asymmetries can affect the nature of competition
in oligopolistic industries. It is interesting to combine these results with the lite-
rature studying the strategic role of financial structure. Brander and Lewis (1986)
have argued that debt could act as a commitment device in a Cournot oligopoly
and therefore affect the extent of competition. A firm with a high leverage pur-
sues an aggressive strategy since it figures it has nothing to lose from doing so.
Being conservative means almost certain default, while being aggressive is the
only chance the firm has of getting ahead. This strategy has been compared to a
hockey team trailing by a goal late in the game that decides to pull out its goalie.
A firm with high leverage thus behaves aggressively, which, in a Cournot industry,
forces its rivals to behave less aggressively. The levered firm can then gain a com-
petitive advantage over its rivals by raising its debt–equity ratio. This is possible
under the assumption that the firm is committed not to alter its debt-equity ratio
ex post once it has been set. This may be a reasonable assumption for firms for
which issuing equity is very costly due either to transaction costs or informational
asymmetries.
With tax asymmetries, it is not obvious that debt still has the same strategic value.
Increasing debt makes it more likely that the firm will realize tax losses since it can
deduct interest payments from its taxable income. As we saw in the last section,
16 I implicitly assume here that only the firm could use these tax losses. If the financial contract forbids the firm from
doing so, then transferability of losses becomes a non-issue.
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these losses have a negative strategic value in a Cournot industry. When choosing
financial structure, firms therefore trade off the immediate strategic value of debt
with the possible future reduction in strategic advantage if the firm realizes losses
at the end of the period.
In such case, being able to transfer losses to a firm in a different industry would
mitigate that second effect and potentially restore the strategic value of debt.
This may be seen as welfare improving since it results in a more competitive
industry with a lower price. But since this last effect is solely due to the asymmetric
treatment of tax losses, this would go against our definition of a narrow neutral
policy which would favor here not allowing transferability of tax losses.
3.4. Conclusion
A neutral policy for transferability of tax losses is socially optimal in static theo-
ries of financial structure and in dynamic theories of financing under asymmetric
information. A non-neutral policy is optimal when firms and financiers face com-
mitment problems. Transferable tax losses can then act as a valuable collateral
that reduces the commitment problem and improves risk sharing. In that case,
transferability should not be restricted to the same line of business, and the speed
of use of losses may be an instrument that increases the value of the collateral.
It is therefore not clear that the speed of use should be the same as before the
transfer. Finally, in a global context, it is important to remember that the preferred
treatment of debt may induce distortions of its own that may be alleviated by an
appropriate policy on transfers of losses, as is discussed at the end of Section 3.1.
4. Investment and risk-taking
The impact of the asymmetric treatment of tax losses and profits on investment
decisions and risk-taking has not been studied extensively by economists. Before
explaining the results that appear in the literature, it is useful to explain why the
fiscal asymmetry can affect behavior beyond what has already been presented in
earlier sections.
When profits and losses are treated asymmetrically, risk-neutral firms have a non-
linear after-tax profit function in terms of pre-tax profits. It is composed of two
linear segments : one for the taxable region, the other for the non-taxable region.
Since firms face different marginal tax rates over these two regions, the function
becomes non-linear. If, as is usually the case, profits are taxed while losses are
not tax-refunded, the after-tax profit function is concave. The fiscal asymmetry
makes a risk-neutral firm risk-averse. Intuitively, a firm facing an asymmetric tax
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schedule should behave similarly to a risk-averse firm. This is the essence of the
result that we find in the literature.
Auerbach (1986) studies the dynamics of investment under an asymmetric tax
schedule. Losses are not tax-refunded but can be carried forward. He first studies
an income tax where economic depreciation of an investment is deducted against
the income of that investment. He shows that regardless of accumulated losses,
investment is always smaller than under a symmetric tax schedule. Furthermore,
investment is sensitive to the amount of tax losses that the firm has. The higher
the losses are, the larger is the investment. In the limit, as losses become infinite,
investment is arbitrarily close to the investment under symmetric taxation. There
are two ways of explaining this result. First, since losses are not tax-refunded,
losses are more costly after tax than profits are profitable. The marginal benefit
of investment is then reduced, which implies that the firm reduces its investment.
Second, since the firm is effectively risk-averse, it wants to reduce the variance of
firm value, which is achieved through a reduction in its investment.
Under a cash-flow tax, investment is immediately expensed if current profits are
large enough. Results are then different. Firms choose their investment trading off
future after-tax returns with current tax savings. If current profits are high, firms
have a tendency to overinvest to get an immediate tax deduction. Thus, when
current profits are high, firms invest more than under symmetric taxation. When,
however, current profits are relatively low, firms underinvest by the same logic as
under an income tax.
These results imply that the way firms deduct their investment expenditures affects
significantly their investment policy. It is therefore important to assess taxation
policy considering simultaneously the asymmetric treatment of tax losses and
investment tax credits (see Mintz, 1991, for arguments along these lines).
The above analysis does not take into account the fact that firms can mitigate
some of these effects through an offsetting financial policy. Basically, if, due to tax
losses, a firm reduces its value by changing its investment, it can use its financial
policy to offset these effects by effectively endogenizing its tax losses through
an appropriate combination of debt and equity. Alternatively, because tax losses
make firms risk averse, the firms may seek financing to diversify this risk. Mayer
(1986) has shown that a firm could effectively maintain an optimal investment
policy (i.e., the same as under symmetric taxation) by judicious adjustment to its
financial structure. If one believes that asymmetric taxation affects investment
and risk taking, it remains to be explained why firms do not use financial policy
to eliminate investment distortions.
Corporate finance theory can answer this question. Informational asymmetries,
agency costs, and incentives all have an impact on financial policy. It is therefore
likely that firms cannot completely offset investment distortions. Furthermore,
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empirically, debt–equity ratios are far less volatile than tax losses. We can then
conclude that asymmetric taxation does influence investment.
It is not obvious whether small firms are more affected than larger firms or not. On
the one hand, small firms do not have the financial flexibility to offset investment
distortions. On the other hand, however, as Auerbach (1986) shows, investment is
increasing in the amount of tax losses. Since small firms are more likely to have
larger losses, their investment may be less distorted. Furthermore, small firms face
a lower nominal tax rate than do larger firms. It may well be the case that small
firms’ investment policy is less distorted than larger firms’.
An important aspect of this literature that does not appear to have been studied
is the macroeconomic implications of tax asymmetries. As shown by Auerbach
(1986), investment is more variable under an asymmetric tax regime than under
a symmetric one. If losses are correlated across firms and industries, it may be
the case that tax asymmetries have a countercyclical effect on the economy. In a
downturn, many firms would have experienced losses, which would then reduce
their implicit marginal tax rate, and therefore increase their investment. So firms
would tend to invest more in recessions. It would be interesting to study the
smoothing role of tax asymmetries in a real-business cycle model.
Is there a role for tax losses transferability ? As in the previous section, tax asym-
metries create distortions which may be reduced when firms pool profits. In the
limit, when the aggregate risk is low, a coalition of all firms would have positive
profits with near certainty, and would thus not be subject to the fiscal asymmetry.
So, if losses are transferable without restrictions, distortions can be eliminated with
greater probability. It should be stressed, however, that the takeover mechanism
is a very imperfect mechanism to reduce these distortions, namely because it is
subject to other imperfections that were discussed earlier. But these considerations
should not be taken into account if one adopts the narrow definition of neutrality
since the only distortions arise from the asymmetric treatment of tax losses.
Conclusion
This paper has surveyed the current literature on tax asymmetries and mergers to
understand the efficiency consequences of allowing or not the transferability of
tax losses upon a change of control. There are many motives for mergers. Firms
can merge for reasons of synergy, for diversification of their cash flows, or for
reasons of efficiencies. In most cases, tax losses are likely to play a marginal
role since these other motives will usually dominate the incentives to merge. One
would then expect that tax losses will not be pivotal and will only play a role
at the margin. This does not mean that they should be ignored when considering
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whether tax losses can be transfered or not upon a change of control. The optimal
policy should be dictated by whether there are too many or too few mergers, which
in turn depends on market inefficiencies.
If there are inefficiencies in the market for corporate control per se, it seems that
other policy instruments can be used to restore efficiency, or at least alleviate the
inefficiencies. For example, the public good aspect of takeover activity can be
reduced by limiting the rights of minority shareholders. Managerial myopia can
be reduced with a managerial incentive package that stresses the long term. For
example, a manager may be forced to keep his shares for a long period, say ten
years. In these cases, it seems that the question of transferability of tax losses is
marginal. A neutral policy should be favored.
If inefficiencies are related to the operations of the firm rather than the market for
corporate control per se, then mergers and the transfer of tax losses may play a
significant role. When product markets are imperfectly competitive, transferability
of tax losses can have strategic effects. Unfortunately, the theory is not clear about
the optimal policy. As it is often the case in industrial organization, conclusions
may depend on the nature of competition in an industry. Whether competition is
Cournot or Bertrand will affect the design of the optimal policy. Since it seems
that such policy cannot be made contingent on the nature of competition, more
research is warranted to reach more robust conclusions.
When there are imperfect financial markets, then mergers and the transfer of tax
losses also play a significant role. Imperfections in financial markets usually imply
that a firm cannot borrow as much as it wants to. When a firm is in financial
distress, it may have difficulty to refinance itself. And this is precisely an instance
where a firm is likely to have accumulated losses. When tax losses are transferable
upon change of control, they act as an asset for the distressed firm. Such asset can
be used as a collateral to secure more financing. Transferable tax losses may then
help reduce financial market imperfections. I believe this is the strongest case for
allowing tax losses to be fully transferable.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, I provide a short summary of the main aspects of the fiscal
treatment of tax losses for Canada and the United States. For additional details,
Couzin (1991) provides an excellent non-technical presentation of the various
features of the Canadian law.
A.1 Canada
The tax base for corporations in Canada is income (as opposed, for example, to
gross revenues). This implies that a negative tax base becomes a definite possibility.
Various issues arise regarding the fiscal treatment of income losses. First, when can
losses be aggregated with positive income from other sources to reduce taxable
income. This issue arises within the same accounting period across activities, and
across accounting periods. Finally, the issue of refundability of tax losses is a
major concern. If positive income is taxed, should negative income bear a negative
income tax ? I now review some legal aspects relating to these issues.
The first step is to calculate business income. It is gross revenues from which
various deductions can be subtracted. There are some peculiarities that should
be mentioned here. For example, interest payments on debt are deductible while
dividend payments on equity are not tax deductible. Also, some equipment may be
subject to accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. Firms are allowed generous
write-offs for R&D expenditures. The resource sector also benefits from preferential
tax treatment, namely for exploration expenses. These measures were introduced
to stimulate investment in certain sectors of activity, or focus investment in certain
areas (such as R&D). These deductions mean that negative business income is more
than a theoretical curiosity.
In general, aggregation of business incomes across activities within the same firm
is allowed subject to the provision that capital losses can only be applied against
capital gains. Aggregation through time is subject to the following limits. Business
losses may be carried back three years and forward seven years. Capital losses may
be carried back three years and forward indefinitely. Such aggregation allows a
kind of refundability, although not at full value since carryforwards do not bear
interest and the probability of realizing on a carry forward is generally less than
one. It is important to point out that carryforwards can effectively be more than
seven years if businesses in a loss status delay some expenses such as depreciation
until they become taxable again.
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Another way of getting a tax refund is to transfer tax losses from a non-taxable
firm to a taxable one. There are four ways of doing so. First, agents can use
statutory transfers. In the resource sector, firms can use flow-through shares to
finance exploration expenditures. Such equity financing allows the subscriber to
deduct the share price from its taxable income if the issuer has renounced to
its deductions on exploration expenses. A non-taxable issuer can therefore raise
equity financing at a favorable after-tax price since subscribers get a generous tax
deduction by investing in these flow-through shares.
Second, agents can use non-statutory transfers. The general principle is that a non-
taxable firm raises capital at an advantageous after-tax cost of funds by providing
investors access to some of its deductions or credits. For such a transaction to
benefit from this favorable tax status, it has to be the case that it cannot be viewed
as a disguised loan. A simple example would be subscribers that borrow to invest
in shares of a project. They benefit from the interest deduction while the non-
taxable firm would not be able to do so. Leasing of equipment is another mean of
transferring deductions. Leasing, however, is subject to the restriction that capital
cost allowances cannot create losses that would be applied against positive income
elsewhere in the corporation (unless leasing is the main business activity).
Third, the sale of a corporation can allow the transfer of tax losses subject to the
restrictions that such losses can only be used in a similar line of business and that
the acquirer buy more than 50% of the voting shares of the sold corporation. It
should also be mentioned that capital losses are not transferable to the acquiring
party. Furthermore, the fiscal year of the acquired company ends on the day of
change of control such that current losses are treated as the previous year’s losses.
Finally, given the differential fiscal treatment of interest payments and dividends,
firms may implicitly transfer tax losses by changing their financial structure and
paying dividends instead of interest payments.
As stated above, this is a very succinct summary of some of the legal aspects of
the fiscal treatment of tax losses. More details are provided in Couzin (1991).
A.2 United States
This summary is based on Joint Committee on Taxation (1987). The basic principle
guiding the American fiscal treatment of losses is that the law should help preserve
the needed averaging function over time to reduce distortions caused by the annual
accounting system. The law would not then place at a disadvantage firms for which
profits are highly volatile. Upon change of control, this principle implies that the
law should put limitations on carryover against income earned in unrelated lines of
business since the contrary would not serve the averaging function. Upon change
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of control, the American legislator has therefore opted for imposing limitations
on the sources of income against which losses can be carried over rather than
increasing time limitations for which these losses could be used.
Any net operating loss can be carried back three years and forward, fifteen years.
Upon change of control (see Joint Committee on Taxation, 1987, for a detailed
description of what is effectively a change of control), there is an annual limitation
on the amount of losses that can be carried forward to the profitable firm (it could
be the acquirer or the target). The maximum allowed amount is equal to the pre-
acquisition fair market value of the loss corporation’s equity times the long term
return on federal government bonds. The purpose of this limitation is to ensure
that, following a change of control, losses are used at the same speed as they would
have been without the change.
There is a limitation to the extent to which losses can be carried forward. The new
venture should pass the “continuity of business enterprise” test requiring that a
significant portion of the acquired assets be used in a business activity at all times
for a two-year period following the ownership change. This implies that, either the
loss corporation is pursuing its historic business, or its assets are used in a business
activity following the ownership change.
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